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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, there are two basic structures for dealing
with trade complaints. The first structure is the rule-oriented sys-
tem of settling trade disputes. Here problems are resolved within
the framework of legal standards. The second structure utilizes the
political system. Relief can be sought from either Congress or the
President. The rule of law system is designed to produce certainty
of results. When complaints allege unfair competition, the relevant
statutes require investigations with little room for political influ-
* The Honorable Paula Stern is President of the Stern Group, an international trade
advisory firm based in Washington, D.C. She is the former Chairwoman of the United
States International Trade Commission. Dr. Stern is also a fellow of the Foreign Policy
Institute of Johns Hopkins University. This article is based on an issue paper prepared
jointly by the author and Charles A. Hunnicutt.
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ence. Instead experts, evidence, data, and analyses play significant
roles.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. FAIR TRADE LAWS
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is the para-
gon of the rule-oriented approach to settling trade disputes.' An
independent agency of the U.S. government, it is often called the
shield of Congress-an instrument that allows a swift, non-political
approach to trade issues that would be difficult for an elected body
to resolve.2 At the ITC, all industries and countries-large and
small-can get. their day in court. With the ITC anchoring the sys-
tem, there is a reliance on expert opinion, and a definite procedure
is apparent to all litigants.'
Most ITC investigations involve alleged unfair competition
from subsidized or dumped imports." Complaints are filed under
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes (Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930).1 The majority of these investigations concern
possible injury to a domestic industry as a result of dumping or the
sale of imported goods in the United States at less than fair value
("LTFV").G
Sales at LTFV in the United States are sales at less than the
market price in the country of origin.' If the Department of Com-
merce ("Commerce") determines that sales of imports are at less
than fair value, the ITC is charged with determining whether a
domestic industry is currently being or is likely to be materially
1. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West Supp. 1989). Section 2252 provides guidelines regulat-
ing petitions for import relief, investigations and recommendations by the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC), and reports submitted to the President. Id.
2. See Stern & Wechsler, Escape Clause Relief and Recessions: An Economic and Le-
gal Look at Section 201, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN
AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 195, 199 (1986).
3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1982) (empowering the ITC to procure the services
of experts and consultants). See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West Supp. 1989) for an outline of the
procedure to be observed in pursuing trade disputes before the ITC.
4. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION ANN. REP. 6 (1988) [hereinafter ANN. REP.]. In
1988, the ITC conducted 68 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations out of a
total of 107 Title VII investigations. Id.
5. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671a (West Supp. 1989) (initiating a countervailing duty investi-
gation); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a (West Supp. 1989) (initiating an antidumping duty in-
vestigation).
6. See ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 6. In 1988, the ITC conducted 56 antidumping inves-
tigations out of a total of 107 Title VII investigations. Id.
7. See 1979 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 446.
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injured, or is prevented from being established by reason of the
importation of such merchandise into the United States." A posi-
tive determination by the ITC results in an order by Commerce
under which a dumping duty is collected by the Customs Service
on the articles sold at less than fair value.9
The ITC conducts a similar type of investigation relating to
allegations of imports subsidized by foreign governments.' 0 These
investigations can result in the imposition by Commerce of coun-
tervailing duties on the subsidized imports."
Since 1979, the statutes governing both types of investigations
have included a material injury test for signatories to the Tokyo
Round codes of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)."2 The subsidized or dumped imports themselves are not
illegal. A countervailing or antidumping duty will be applied only
when a material injury to a U.S. industry can be shown." The duty
is not intended to be punitive, rather it is calculated to remove any
future unfair advantage. "
Implicit in the concept of fairness in the law is the notion that
American workers and businesses should compete on the basis of
comparative advantage-that they should not have to adjust to un-
fairly traded goods. While consumers are expected to forgo the
lower prices which would result from dumping or subsidies in order
to protect the interests of the domestic producers of the product, a
duty is applied only when the petitioner can demonstrate that it is
being materially injured." Thus the material injury test is, in ef-
fect, a compromise between diverging points of view, accommodat-
ing the concern for the welfare of domestic workers and producers
in the affected industry in a manner that minimizes the disruption
of commerce and attempts to maximize value to the consumer.
Fairness also plays a major role in the U.S. protection of intel-
lectual property-ownership conferring the right to possess, use or
8. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1982).
10. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7) (West Supp. 1989) ("[Mlaterial injury means harm which
is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.").
13. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (countervailing duty and
antidumping duty, respectively).
14. See Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARV. L. REv. 546, 549-50 (1987).
15. See supra note 13.
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dispose of products created by human ingenuity-under Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.10 Section 337 cases encompass a wide
variety of intellectual property causes of action: patent, trademark,
or copyright infringement; passing off an item as being made by
another, well-known firm or misappropriation of another firm's
distinctive packaging for its product; and misappropriation of
trade secrets.1" If the ITC determines that imports violate the in-
tellectual property rights of a U.S. industry, it may impose cease
and desist and/or exclusion orders on the infringing import.'"
The original purpose of Section 337 was to protect and conse-
quently encourage American production, jobs, and capital from un-
fair import competition." Given the changes made in Section 337
by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,0 the law
has become less a trade law and more a law aimed at preventing
violations of intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, if the ITC
finds a violation and fashions a remedy, it still must also consider
public interest factors, which in some cases might outweigh the
need for relief.21
III. REASSESSING THE TRADE LAWS
From the point of view of exporters to the United States, the
unfair trade laws are damaging weapons in the arsenals of Ameri-
can commercial firms. However, pursuit of these cases is costly for
petitioner and defendant alike.2 Unfair trade practices of other
nations, however vexing to individual U.S. industries, are not the
chief menace to the international trading system or even to
16. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §
1337 (West Supp. 1989)).
17. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West Supp. 1989).
18. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(e),(f) (cease and desist orders and exclusion orders, re-
spectively).
19. See J. DoBsoN, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS 103 (1976).
20. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West Supp. 1989) explicitly states that patents, copyrights, and
trademarks are protected under this section and, in effect, dispenses with the injury
requirement.
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982) (the ITC must consider such factors as the effect of
an exclusion of the article upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
U.S. economy, production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States and,
finally, U.S. consumers).
22. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: PURSUIT OF TRADE LAW REMEDIES BY
SMALL BUSINESS, GAO/NSIAD-89-69BR (1988) (Briefing Report to Congressional Re-
questers).
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America. At the height of activity on the ITC's docket in the mid-
1980s, had the ITC sustained all unfair trade allegations by domes-
tic industry, less than five percent of the total value of imports
into the United States would have been called into question.23 In
recent years this figure has dropped to less than one percent.2"
The administration of trade law has become very complex and
can have a chilling effect on overall trade as a result. Reference to
three very complicated cases illustrates the difficulties that have
accreted in the practice of the unfair trade laws. These cases raise
fundamental questions about their fairness and relevance in a
globalized economy where firms are losing their national identity:
Forklift Trucks from Japan;2 5 Forged Undercarriages from Italy;26
23. See P. Stern, The Trade Deficit: Ways to Spell Relief, at the National Economists
Club Trade Policy Forum 7 (Nov. 12, 1985) (unpublished speech available in the offices of
the Inter-American Law Review, University of Miami School of Law).
24. As Ambassador Rufus H. Yerxa has stated:
The fact is that the volume of U.S. imports affected by antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty investigations as a share of total imports amounted to only two-
tenths of one percent in 1987, four-tenths of one percent in 1988, and two-tenths
of one percent during the first half of 1989. Furthermore, the average level of
antidumping duties assessed in 1987 on dumped or subsidized goods was only
1.20 percent. The average was 3.70 percent in 1988, and 1.84 percent during the
first half of 1989.
Statement by Ambassador Rufus H. Yerxa on GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Dec.
14, 1989) (emphasis added).
25. Internal Combustion Engine Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC Pub. 2082, Inv.
No. 731-TA-377 (May 1988). The ITC found that U.S. producers were being materially in-
jured by Japanese imports of forklift trucks at less than fair value ("LTFV"). The produc-
tion of internal combustion forklift trucks is characterized by substantial international inte-
gration. As a result, the ITC was compelled to make a threshold determination as to what
constitutes a domestically produced forklift truck. Petitioners proposed a frame-based defi-
nition. If the frame is produced in the United States, the forklift truck is U.S.-produced for
purposes of the antidumping statute. Respondents countered by proposing a value added
test for determining whether a forklift truck is U.S.-produced. For instance, if the value
added in the United States is over 35%, the forklift truck is U.S.-produced.
In this instance, the ITC adopted the frame-based test proposed by petitioners. At the
same time, the problems inherent in a frame-based test did not go unnoticed. Because the
frame of a forklift truck typically constitutes only 10% of the value added of a forklift
truck, it would be possible to have a forklift truck whose frame was made in the United
States but whose engine, tires, steering mechanism, etc. were made overseas classified as
U.S. produced. Did Congress intend that a product which is 90% foreign value added be
classified a U.S. product? Alternatively, when the frame is imported but seventy to ninety
percent of the forklift is U.S. value added, should this forklift be classified as non U.S.-
produced? The frame-based test clearly presents potential problems for determining what is
a U.S. product under the antidumping laws. As "domestic" producers rely increasingly on
extensive importation of finished and nearly finished products, the line between U.S. and
non-U.S. industry and products continues to blur.
26. Forged Undercarriage Components from Italy, USITC Pub. 1465, Inv. No. 701-TA-
201 (Dec. 1983). The ITC made a determination that the domestic industry was suffering
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and Subway Cars from Canada."' These cases raise a number of
questions. What is a U.S. company? What is a U.S. product? Is the
law retarding "unfair" trade practices? Does the law help Ameri-
can workers or enhance America's manufacturing capacity? Or
does the law merely advance the commercial strategy of multina-
tionals that may or may not be American-owned and directed and
that may or may not be producing within the United States?2"
In recent years, the integrity of the unfair trade law practice
has further deteriorated because the Reagan Administration
tended to act to advance businesses' adjustment to changes in in-
ternational competition only when the industry alleged "unfair-
ness." Then, when the political stakes from sectoral pressure got
too heated, the "unfair trade" investigations would result in fully
politicized "settlements" or "suspension agreements" whereby ex-
porting nations would agree to quantitative restrictions on their
shipments to the United States.2" The effect of these settlements,
material injury as a result of imports of semifinished forged undercarriage links and rollers,
which were alleged to be subsidized. The author dissented from this determination, finding
that factors other than subsidized imports from Italy were causing decline in the domestic
industries' performance.
In this case, the major domestic producer of semifinished links, Caterpillar, was also a
significant importer. Caterpillar, therefore, would have to have been inflicting injury upon
itself if the imports in question were truly injurious. Exclusion of Caterpillar from the group
identified as "domestic producers" would significantly bias and distort any analysis of the
"domestic industry." The presence of a major U.S. producer who also imports extensively
created a problem for the ITC. Categorizing Caterpillar with other U.S. producers reduced
the likelihood of any showing of material injury to U.S. producers while failure to categorize
it as a U.S. producer served to create a distorted data base representing U.S. producers.
27. Rail Passenger Cars from Canada, USITC Pub. 1277, Inv. No. 701-TA-182 (Aug.
1982). The ITC made a determination that a domestic manufacturer of rail passenger cars
was likely to suffer material injury as a result of the importation of rail passenger car shells
allegedly subsidized by the Canadian government. In this case, the domestic producer, the
Budd Company ("Budd"), submitted a bid to the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority which called for production of the car shells in Portugal. Budd's reasons for
sourcing the shell in Portugal included: the availability of government-supported export fi-
nancing and the lack of capacity to manufacture additional shells in its domestic facilities.
Despite this election to source the shells overseas, the ITC determined that Budd was a
"domestic producer" of shells. The majority found that the adverse consequences of a busi-
ness decision to source offshore in order to compete with an allegedly subsidized foreign
prime contractor was a factor which the ITC could consider in analyzing whether material
injury exists with regard to a domestic industry. The author dissented, determining that
there was no basis for treating Budd as a "domestic" producer of shells when, had its bid
been successful, its domestic shell manufacturing capability would not have been utilized.
28. See supra note 25.
29. See Yochelson, Outlook for U.S. Economic Diplomacy: Europe and the Pacific Ba-
sin, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR NEw REALI-
TIES 23-24 (1985).
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at a minimum, has been to undermine the claim that the "unfair"
trade laws were rule-oriented and not political.
In the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Con-
gress added new complexity to the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws.30 For example, the new trade law contains several provi-
sions intended to plug "loopholes" in the administration of the un-
fair trade laws dealing with dumped or subsidized imports.31 These
new provisions, however, may actually have a chilling effect on im-
porters, foreign investors and even American companies since to-
day most American manufacturers also import.
Depending on their implementation by Commerce, the great-
est potential irritants are the provisions to prevent circumvention
of the trade laws. These provisions allow the government to impose
duties on goods assembled in the United States from imported
parts that are used to produce finished products where those parts
have been found to be dumped or subsidized, if the value added in
the United States is "small.", 2 The idea is to prevent a foreign
manufacturer from trying to evade import duties by bringing the
components into the United States in a form requiring only trivial
changes (and, therefore, creating no new jobs or productive capac-
ity). "Small," however, is a concept that is highly subjective and
easy to manipulate. Therefore, this rule could have a chilling effect
on foreign producers contemplating assembly operations in the
United States-an effect that may not be in America's overall eco-
nomic interest.
This provision could also ensnare companies which the legisla-
tors did not intend to include. For example, if the U.S. government
finds Japanese companies guilty of dumping semiconductors and
an unrelated U.S. manufacturer imports wafers made by one of the
subject Japanese companies, the U.S. manufacturer could possibly
wind up paying dumping duties, if its product's value added in the
United States was not considered large enough. This duty would
hurt the U.S. manufacturer's competitiveness vis-a-vis its foreign
competition.
A similar provision would subject imports of finished goods
from third countries to antidumping duties if they are made from
30. See Harbrecht & Dryden, A Trade Bill Filled with Trade-Offs, Bus. WK., May 9,
1988, at 42-43.
31. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677j (West Supp. 1989); 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
1547, 1632-37.
32. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677j(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1989).
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components produced in a country that is subject to these duties
on the same or a similar finished product.3" So, hypothetically, if
the Japanese semiconductor company shipped components to Sin-
gapore for assembly, Singapore's exports of semiconductors could
be subject to the same antidumping or countervailing duties to
which the Japanese company who supplied the components is sub-
ject, if the value added in Singapore was considered "small."
While the change in the law was intended to prevent circum-
vention of existing law, it could open a Pandora's box of problems
for innocent U.S. companies that attempt to enhance their com-
petitiveness by importing components. The new provision could
also sideswipe multinationals who may "taint" their finished prod-
uct by inadvertently using components that are also used by the
supplier to make products subject to U.S. unfair trade actions.
In sum, the policing purpose of these new provisions may be
achieved at the price of injecting new uncertainty and inefficiencies
into the world trade system. At a minimum, this change calls for
knowledgeable and fair administration of these provisions by per-
sons sensitive to the requirements of the global economy.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
Historically, as the United States worked to liberalize interna-
tional commerce, it also created exemptions or shelter for declining
or particularly powerful domestic industries.3 4 In the process, the
so-called fairness laws have sometimes been manipulated by prac-
titioners in pursuit of the immediate interests of domestic produc-
ers, distorting the original intent of the law. As a result, protection
against imports in the United States-whether or not they were
unfairly traded-soared from eight percent coverage in 1975 to
twenty-one percent in 1984.35 Unfortunately, the protection af-
forded, usually either tariffs or quotas, has fallen short of its in-
tended goal of making beneficiaries more competitive. Indeed,
much of the recent productivity gains in U.S. manufacturing has
33. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677j(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
34. A well known example is the steel industry. For a detailed examination of restric-
tive measures applied for the benefit of the steel industry see Comment, The Anatomy of
Protectionism: The Voluntary Restraint Agreements on Steel Imports, 35 UCLA L. REV.
953 (1988).
35. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOTT, TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
THIRTY-ONE CASE STUDIEs 20 (1986).
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been in industries hit hardest by foreign competition. 6 Clearly if
the United States is to regain its competitiveness, it needs an af-
firmative government demanding change, not simply protecting
against it. America's chief concern should not be whether the trad-
ing field is level. Instead of focussing on the tilt of the field, it must
concentrate instead on rebuilding the strength of the team it puts
on the field.
U.S. industry is facing fundamental competitiveness problems
that will not be resolved merely by passing new trade laws or en-
couraging depreciation of the dollar. Low-wage competition has hit
many U.S. manufacturers hard. Inadequate investment and poor
management practices have also hurt American competitiveness."
America's trade relations with Japan illustrate this point. The
productivity of U.S. industry is disappointing compared with that
of Japan.38 Thus, even a further fall in the dollar and removal of
export barriers in Japan would still likely leave the United States
with a continuing problem in its ability to compete with Japanese
businesses, either in the United States or in Japan.
What, then, can the world trade system-and the legal mecha-
nism for its regulation-do to adjust to the internationalization of
world commerce?
Some reforms of the GATT system are on the table for the
Uruguay Round,39 but longer range concepts to build political sup-
port for limiting unfair practices in individual countries should be
considered. The following are some examples of options which
could be discussed. They represent sharp departures from the path
we have been following.
First, in the subsidy/countervail area, if country A imposes a
countervailing duty on a subsidy of country B, country B should be
able to go to a GATT panel and demonstrate that country A is not
in substantial compliance with the GATT subsidy code, even if
36. See Berger, Productivity: Why It's the No. 1 Underachiever, Bus. WK., Apr. 20,
1987, at 54-55.
37. For a detailed analysis of flawed American industry practices and strategies ex-
amined in light of Japanese practices see J. BARANSON, THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE TO U.S.
INDUSTRY (1981).
38. See Berger, supra note 36.
39. The Uruguay Round is a series of trade negotiations undertaken by officials from
seventy-four countries and conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT). The goals of the Uruguay Round are to create better trade relation-
ships around the world and to combat protectionist policies. See Koepp, A Launch for the
Uruguay Round, TimE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 55.
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country A's subsidies are in another product line. If the GATT
panel concludes that country A is not in compliance with the sub-
sidy code, then country B would have the right to ask for compen-
sation for country A's original countervailing duty action. In prac-
tice, if a GATT panel determines that country A was not in
compliance with the subsidy codes and orders it to pay compensa-
tion to country B, country A will stop imposing the countervailing
duty. Eventually, in both countries, industries which seek to elimi-
nate subsidized foreign competition would insist on the elimination
of subsidies at home.
0
A second, even more radical solution would eliminate an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws altogether. The European
Community has adopted this policy between its member states.
Canada and the United States could move in that direction in the
United States-Canada Free Trade Pact."1 The truth is that the av-
erage U.S. businessperson cares little about prices of his foreign
competitor in the foreign market or whether his foreign competi-
tion receives government aid. Instead, the U.S. businessperson is
worried about prices and competition in the United States. Thus,
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws have little founda-
tion in the daily lives of the injured parties and often lead the par-
ties down an expensive, time-consuming, and often unpredictable
path. Because the Title VII laws are intended to exclude only un-
fair trade, the United States tends to label all trade which it ex-
cludes as unfair, merited or not. The United States might better
promote its own interests and provoke less foreign resentment if it
stopped wrapping itself in the flag of "fair trade."
A third reform would make the "fair" trade escape clause less
burdensome for a country to utilize. It could also move away from
the present fixation on the "unfair" nature of import problems.
Like the first proposal, it would require a new GATT panel. This
panel would examine adjustment plans for industries receiving es-
cape clause relief. If the panel finds the adjustment plan adequate
to resolve the problems which it was intended to address, then
there would be no requirement for the country using import relief
under the escape clause to compensate its affected trade partners.
This would reward appropriate, efficient use of the escape clause.
40. The author wishes to acknowledge discussions with Peter Ehrenhaft on this topic.
41. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851.
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Even if these more radical solutions are not explored at the
GATT, the administration of U.S. trade law should no longer rely
primarily on the "unfair trade" laws, which are beginning to lose
their meaningful place in the globalized world of commerce. In-
stead, section 201-the escape clause 2-should be better utilized
to provide industries and workers adjustment relief to changing
trade patterns. Section 201 is an amalgam of the rule oriented and
political approach. It provides import relief for industries adjusting
to new international competition even where there is no allegation
of unfairness.
There is much the United States can do in administering sec-
tion 201 to create an effective policy for adjustment to import com-
petition. The United States must act to insure that new public in-
vestments assist industries in earning lasting returns. Aid to
distressed industries must follow from a comprehensive analysis of
the competitive challenge. Finally, the government must condition
its action on the cooperative efforts of all who gain from its help,
all who can contribute to an industry's viability in the new interna-
tional environment.
In sum, the United States needs to move away from its fixa-
tion on "unfair" imports as a problem and on import relief as the
sole solution. Instead, it should use a more appropriate test to trig-
ger assistance-an assessment of an industry's ability to compete
in the international market. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act moves in this direction.
V. SECTION 301 AND FOREIGN MARKETS
As the dollar declined from its 1985 heights and U.S. firms
consequently became more price competitive, changes in the 1988
Trade Act reflected U.S. policy which was focusing less on the fair-
ness of imports sold in its domestic market, and more on the fair-
ness of access for its exports in foreign markets.4 3 The "super 301"
42. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-14 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West Supp. 1989)). Section 201 allows domestic industries
to petition for import relief in order to make them more competitive or allow them to effect
an orderly transfer of resources to more productive pursuits. Such relief is predicated on the
petitioner passing a three-part test. First, there must be a showing that competitive imports
have increased. Second, the petitioner must show that the domestic industry has been seri-
ously injured or is threatened with serious injury. Finally, the petitioner must show that
those competing imports are a substantial cause of the injury.
43. See, e.g., Neff, Magnusson & Holstein, Rethinking Japan, Bus. WK., Aug. 7, 1989,
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provision in the new trade bill, for example, has stimulated more
Section 301 complaints.""
Section 301 underscores three major themes in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act: first, Congress's desire to battle
unfair trade practices overseas; second, its desire to shift the focus
of U.S. trade policy away from deference to diplomatic considera-
tions and, consequently, away from complete Presidential discre-
tion; and, third, its desire to push for export opportunities. Com-
plaints can no longer languish on the President's desk. In fact, the
President's authority to make legal determinations and to decide
what is the course of action under Section 301 is transferred to his
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)." New requirements on the
USTR to identify and pursue trade liberalization priorities with
specific "priority foreign countries,' '4 6 new deadlines for initiating
cases,47 reduced time limits on the USTR's negotiations with trad-
ing partners 8 and mandated retaliation (with some provisos)
against international legal rights of the United States4e are all
stimulating the filing of more complaints with the USTR. The
strengthened 301 is prompting greater Congressional monitoring 0
at 50; Sanger, Negotiations Are Rejected by Japanese, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, at 31, col.
1.
44. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 1989)). Under the "super 301," the United
States Trade Representative, appointed by the President, is required to determine whether
foreign countries are employing discriminatory or unfair trade barriers which effectively
limit the access of American industries to those foreign markets. Once the Trade Represen-
tative has identified the countries, the Trade Representative will attempt to negotiate agree-
ments which will provide for a reduction of the practices, elimination of the practices or
compensation for the ill-effects of the foreign discriminatory practices on domestic indus-
tries. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420(c) (West Supp. 1989). If negotiations fail, the Trade Representative
is empowered to impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods or services exported
into the United States from those countries. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c) (West Supp. 1989).
45. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 1989). Carla Hills is the current United States
Trade Representative. She evaluates petitions filed by the interested parties, initiates inves-
tigations and identifies countries that have erected unfair barriers against American exports.
She also negotiates with representatives of those countries, seeking greater access for Ameri-
can exports. If these negotiations fail, she in some cases, must, in other cases, may retaliate
against the offending countries by limiting their access to the lucrative American market.
Her power to take such action is subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President.
46. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1989).
47. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a), (b) (West Supp. 1989).
48. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a) (West Supp. 1989).
49. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
50. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2419(3) (West Supp. 1989). This subsection requires the Trade
Representative to submit reports, semi-annually, to the House of Representatives and the
Senate describing the status of petitions filed, any action taken by the Trade Representa-
tive, and the commercial effects of action taken under Section 301.
[Vol. 21:1
REGULATING U.S. TRADE
and is forcing market access issues onto the United States agenda
with many of its most important trading partners.
VI. REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Meanwhile, interest in import barriers against goods-whether
they are erected at home or overseas-is giving way to interest in
barriers to capital. This trend will continue as long as foreigners
continue to hold American dollars and as long as American assets
remain attractively priced in depreciated dollar terms. Foreign in-
vestment will remain a source of trade disputes as long as Ameri-
cans watch foreigners buy assets in the United States while the
foreigners's own domestic markets restrict similar foreign
investment.
6 1
Foreign investments of all kinds in the United States total
$1.5 trillion.52 That sounds like an intimidating figure; but, it needs
to be broken down. All but $200 billion has come since 1974.11
Eighty percent of the total is passive, held in government securities
or as a portfolio investment in common stocks and other long-term
holdings." And a great deal of this-about $290 billion-is the fi-
nancing that temporarily covers our national debt.5 5 Our deficits
are being met today with savings from abroad, savings Americans
will have to repay in the future, with interest.
Meanwhile, foreign control is limited to under five percent of
U.S. assets, and Japanese control is only sixteen percent of that
total.56 But direct foreign investment, whether for majority owner-
ship or minority influence, has the nationalist bells sounding. The
echo of those bells is found in the figure of a startlingly high per-
centage of Americans who favor curbs on foreign investment in the
United States. A recent survey found that a vast majority of Amer-
icans favor limits on this investment from overseas. 7 Obviously,
many Americans fear losing control of the nation's economy and
destiny.
51. See Neff, Magnusson & Holstein, supra note 43, at 47.
52. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States in 1988, SURV.




56. Buy America While Stocks Last, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 1989, at 63.




Restrictions on foreign investment in the United States are
now seriously under consideration. In fact, the 1988 trade bill as-
signed new responsibilities to the Defense Department as watch-
dog over foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. 8 The Exon-Florio
amendment (Section 5021) grants the President new authority to
review certain mergers, acquisitions and takeovers of U.S. firms on
national security grounds. 9 The Defense Department has the
power to trigger an investigation of foreign takeovers in the name
of national security. The President has final say in blocking any
deal. Just before President Reagan left office, he delegated his au-
thority to an inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States ("CFIUS").0
Secretary Brady of the Treasury Department chairs the com-
mittee. In February 1989, the first Exon-Florio decision reached
the committee, but President Bush declined to stop the takeover
of Monsanto Electric Materials by a West German company. 1
Subsequently, in the fall of 1989, one proposed Japanese takeover
of a New Jersey ceramic firm was modified as a consequence of
CFIUS's recommendation that it be blocked. At this writing, there
are nine other cases that have reached the cabinet-level committee,
awaiting final decision.
So far the amendment has had an unexpected consequence.
U.S. companies and even some foreign companies are rushing to
the Pentagon to shield or promote proposed mergers. As former
Deputy Undersecretary Robert McCormack said recently, "We
could become the ultimate takeover defense."
Congress is taking a keen interest in the actions of the CFIUS
and its implementation of Section 5021. There is growing concern
in Congress over the rising volume of foreign investment in the
United States. This rests on not only desires to protect national
security, but also on fears that the U.S. high technology infrastruc-
ture is jeopardized by foreign acquisitions in certain "strategic"
sectors such as microelectronics.
Cutting the flow of investment or globalization of capital flows,
58. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1960 (1988).
59. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425-26.
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (1988) (amending Exec. Order No.
11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975)).
61. See Robertson, Monsanto Sale To Get U.S. O.K.: No Threat Seen Despite Opposi-
tion by Industry, ELECTRONIC NEws, Jan. 23, 1989, at 1.
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however, would only signal to our trading partners-who up to now
have taken our dollars in exchange for their goods-that those dol-
lars won't have the buying power they thought. This would have
catastrophic consequences for their willingness to trade-or in-
vest-with the United States in the future. The consequences in
the world trading system would be disastrous-not to mention
what it would mean for our efforts to sustain a budget deficit with-
out foreign financing.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States must come to terms with its trading part-
ners' rise to economic and technological parity with it. It must
come to grips with the fact that our political allies across the At-
lantic and Pacific are also some of our fiercest commercial competi-
tors. The United States must both treat these allies with increased
respect in line with their newfound economic stature, and rethink
its policies if it hopes to recapture global competitiveness. In turn,
in order to rebuff accusations of unfair trade practices, our allies
must adapt their economic and trade policies to correspond to an
enhanced role in the Western alliance. Meanwhile, in order to con-
tinue prospering through increasing trade and to avoid the irri-
tants which flow from our different notions of fairness, trade pro-
fessionals must redouble their efforts to keep open the highways of
commerce by facilitating a better understanding of the rules of the
road.
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